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ABSTRACT
Parents spend considerable sums investing in their children’s development, with their own time
among the most important forms of investment. Given well-documented effects of the Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC) on maternal labor supply, it is natural to ask how the EITC affects
other time allocation decisions, especially time with children. We use the American Time Use
Surveys to study the effects of EITC expansions since 2003 on time devoted to a broad array of
activities, with considerable attention to the amount and nature of time spent with children. Our
results confirm prior evidence that the EITC increases maternal work and reduces time devoted
to home production and leisure. More novel, we show that the EITC also reduces time spent with
children; however, almost none of the reduction comes from time devoted to “investment”
activities. Effects are concentrated among socioeconomically disadvantaged mothers, especially
those that are unmarried. Results are also most apparent for mothers of young children.
Altogether, our results suggest that the increased work associated with EITC expansions over
time has done little to reduce the time mothers devote to active learning and development
activities with their children.
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1.

Introduction
A growing literature documents the importance of family investments for child develop-

ment (e.g., see surveys by Cunha et al., 2006; Heckman and Mosso, 2014; Kalil, 2015), with
parental time becoming an increasingly important form of investment (e.g., Lee and Bowen,
2006; Del Boca et al., 2014; Carneiro et al., 2015; Caucutt et al., 2020). Caucutt et al. (2020)
document that more than two-thirds of all family expenditures on child development (for
children ages 12 or younger) come in the form of parental time investments.
It is tempting to assume that the more time mothers spend working, the less they must
spend with their children. Yet, such an assumption is clearly at odds with the time series
for female labor supply and time with children, which have both increased substantially
in recent decades.1 Cross-sectional relationships are also at odds with a direct trade-off.
For example, Guryan et al. (2008) show that more-educated parents both work more and
spend more time with their children compared to less-educated parents. Clearly, parents
devote time to many leisure and home production activities besides child care (Becker, 1965;
Kooreman and Kapteyn, 1987; Aguiar and Hurst, 2007), and these activities trade off with
work.
Understanding parental (especially maternal) time allocation decisions is critical for understanding the impacts of tax and transfer policies, including many welfare-to-work initiatives, on investments in children and child development. The Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC), the focus of our study, is one of the most significant tax/transfer policies in the
United States, impacting millions of low- to middle-income families. Dahl and Lochner
(2012, 2017), Chetty et al. (2011), Bastian and Michelmore (2018), Manoli and Turner
(2018) and Agostinelli and Sorrenti (2018) estimate positive impacts of expansions in the
EITC on test scores, educational attainment, employment, and earnings of economically disadvantaged children.2 These studies emphasize the increase in financial resources for families
1

See, e.g., Bryant and Zick (1996), Gauthier et al. (2004), Sayer et al. (2004), Bianchi and Robinson
(1997), Craig (2006), Kimmel and Connelly (2007), Guryan et al. (2008), and Kalil et al. (2012) for evidence
on growing parental time with children, while Costa (2000), Goldin (2006), Fernández (2013), and Bastian
(2020) document the substantial increase in female labor supply over time.
2
Hoynes et al. (2015), Averett and Wang (2018), and Braga et al. (2019) show that the EITC also improves
children’s health.
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that benefit from EITC expansions, with much of the increase in family income coming from
greater labor force participation and higher pre-tax family earnings.3 However, Agostinelli
and Sorrenti (2018) and Bastian and Michelmore (2018) also examine concerns that the additional time mothers spend working could offset the benefits associated with greater financial
resources. Indeed, several studies estimate negative effects of full-time maternal employment
on child development (Brooks-Gunn et al., 2002; Ruhm, 2004; Bernal, 2008).4
Even if the EITC increases maternal labor supply by increasing net-of-tax wages for
low-income families, it need not reduce parental time investments in children. The positive
income effects from higher wages can create incentives to increase overall investments in
children. As shown by Caucutt et al. (2020), if all investment inputs are sufficiently complementary, families may wish to increase all types of investments, including time investments,
despite the increase in their opportunity costs. Thus, higher wages may cause parents to
substitute leisure and home production for time at work with little, or even positive, effects
on time spent with children. Indeed, Kooreman and Kapteyn (1987) and Kimmel and Connelly (2007) estimate that increases in maternal wages lead to reductions in time devoted to
leisure and home production but much weaker or even modest positive effects on child care.
Looking more directly at impacts of the EITC, studies spanning three decades of research have consistently concluded that it raises employment among single mothers (Hoffman
and Seidman, 1990; Eissa and Liebman, 1996; Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001; Grogger, 2003;
Hoynes and Patel, 2018; Bastian, 2020).5 Much less is known about changes in other uses
of time. Looking at a broader set of tax policies, Gelber and Mitchell (2012) estimate that
policies that encourage maternal labor supply also reduce time spent on home production.
In their analysis of the EITC using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Bastian and Michelmore (2018) estimate modest and statistically insignificant effects of EITC
expansions on the time parents spend with their children; however, their sample size is small
and estimates imprecise.
3

For these mothers, the EITC also improves health (Evans and Garthwaite, 2014), reduces stress and
financial insecurity (Mendenhall et al., 2012; Jones and Michelmore, 2016), and reduces poverty (Hoynes and
Patel, 2018).
4
Using family and child fixed effects approaches, Heiland et al. (2017) estimate that mothers who work
10 hours more per week spend about 3-4 percent less time with their children.
5
Recently, Kleven (2019) has challenged this conclusion.
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In this paper, we use the 2003-2018 American Time Use Surveys (ATUS) to study, in
detail, the time allocation responses of mothers to state and federal expansions in the EITC
with an emphasis on time spent with children. More specifically, our main (differences-indifferences style) approach estimates the effects of changes in the maximum EITC benefit
level on time spent in different activities, accounting for basic family demographic characteristics, state and time fixed effects (both interacted with marital status and mothers’
educational attainment), and time-varying state-specific measures of economic conditions
and welfare/tax policies. Because ATUS contains detailed information on respondent activities and who they were with during each activity, we are able to estimate the same basic
specifications for a variety of time allocation activities, with and without children.
We begin by estimating impacts of the EITC on mothers’ labor supply over the 2003–
2018 period, noting that most previous research examines earlier expansions (especially the
major expansion from 1993 to 1996). There is some disagreement on the impacts of EITC
expansions after the mid-1990s, with Bastian and Michelmore (2018) and Bastian and Jones
(2019) estimating moderate positive effects (consistent with the previous literature) and
Kleven (2019) finding more modest effects of the 2009 federal expansion and no effects of
state expansions. Our approach is more similar to that taken by Bastian and Michelmore
(2018) and Bastian and Jones (2019),6 reaching similar conclusions: expansions of the EITC
since 2003 have led to increased labor force participation, time spent working, and earnings
among unmarried mothers. We also find suggestive evidence that federal EITC expansions
had larger effects on labor supply—and on other categories of time use—than state EITC
expansions. This result could reflect differences in public awareness of smaller state vs. larger
federal expansions, a general issue highlighted in Chetty et al. (2013).
Next, we show that the increased time working comes at the expense of both leisure
and home production activities. Decomposing single mothers’ time use into time with and
without children, we estimate reductions in home production and leisure time with children,
but no decrease in these activities without children.
Finally, we closely examine how time with children changes, exploring impacts on “in6

Kleven (2019) takes an event-study approach that does not leverage differences in the magnitude of
different expansions for identification.
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vestment” (e.g., reading, playing, helping with homework, providing medical care) vs. “noninvestment” activities. Our estimates suggest no effect of the EITC on total investment time
for families with children of all ages. Reductions in time with children are almost exclusively
observed for passive non-investment activities like mothers’ own personal care, housework,
and errands. One interesting exception is that both married and unmarried mothers respond
to EITC expansions by spending less time providing or obtaining medical care for their children, which may be due to general improvements in children’s health as estimated by Hoynes
et al. (2015), Averett and Wang (2018), and Braga et al. (2019). We also observe modest
increases in the time both single and married mothers play with their children, consistent
with increases in family income if play time is a luxury for parents.

2.

Federal and State EITC Policy Details
The EITC distributes over $65 billion a year to almost 30 million low-income families,

lifting 6 million people out of poverty (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2019). Total
EITC benefits are determined by annual earnings, number of children, state of residence,
and marital status. Figure 1 shows the relationship between EITC benefits and household
earnings by the number of children and marital status for 2018. As is clear from the figure,
the EITC contains a phase-in region, where benefits increase with earnings; a plateau region,
where benefits do not change with earnings; and a phase-out region, where benefits decrease
with earnings. Households that earn beyond this phase-out region are not eligible for the
EITC. In 2018, federal EITC benefits were worth over $6,000 for households with 3 or
more children earning between about $14,000 and $24,000. Maximum possible benefits
available to households with 0, 1, and 2 children were approximately $500, $3,500, and
$5,500, respectively.
Figure 2 shows the evolution of maximum benefits by number of children over time.
The largest EITC expansion occurred between 1993 and 1996, which increased benefits
dramatically for those with at least 2 children. Our analysis covers the years 2003–2018.
The only change in the federal EITC schedule during this period occurred in 2009, when the
maximum credit available to families with 3 or more children increased by about $1,000.

4

As of 2018, 29 states had their own EITC as well. State EITC benefits generally “top-up”
federal EITC benefits by a fixed percent, varying from about 3 to 40 percent (for values up
to $220 to $2,800). Combined, the federal and state EITC can amount to over $9,000 per
year, with the average recipient receiving over $2,500 a year. Figure 3 shows a map of state
EITC rates (as a fraction of federal benefits) in 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2017. Figure A.1
shows the maximum possible federal plus state EITC benefits over time: there is substantial
variation in EITC policy across states within each year.
We combine state and federal annual maximum EITC benefit amounts (based on state of
residence, marital status, number and ages of children by year) into the variable, M axEIT C,
which we measure in thousands of real 2018 dollars.7 Panel A in Figure 4 shows the distribution of M axEIT C for women with 0, 1, 2, and 3 or more children based on our main
sample of women ages 18–49 in the 2003–2018 ATUS. Panel B in Figure 4 shows the distribution of M axEIT C before and after the 2009 federal EITC expansion. Together, these
figures illustrate the type of EITC variation over time and across states that we exploit for
identification.
EITC-eligible children must be age 18 or younger, age 19–23 and a full-time student, or
any age and disabled. However, incorporating these older children could introduce endogeneity and we avoid this concern by defining EITC-eligible dependents as age 18 or younger.

3.

Empirical Strategy
Although the largest EITC expansion occurred in the 1990s, our time-use data only goes

back to 2003. Fortunately, during our sample period, there is substantial identifying variation
across states and years generated by state EITC policy changes and the 2009 federal EITC
expansion, as well as variation within states and years generated by the large difference in
EITC benefits by number of children (see Figures 3 and 4). EITC policy variation allows us
to compare outcomes for women within states and across years, as well as across states and
within years.
An identifying assumption is that EITC policy expansions are not correlated with other
7

We use the Consumer Price Index for all Urban Consumers to adjust for inflation.
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economic policies or conditions which may themselves affect female employment or time use.
For example, if states were more likely to create or expand an EITC during economic expansions and budget surpluses, the relationship between state EITCs, female employment, and
time use would reflect economic conditions in general, not just EITC-led increases in employment. We show below that the EITC expansions during our time period are uncorrelated
with state-year measures of economic conditions and policies.
The combined effects of 2003–2018 state EITC expansions and the 2009 federal EITC
expansions are embodied in M axEIT C, a continuous treatment variable equal to the maximum possible EITC benefits that a family could receive given their state of residence, marital
status, number (and ages) of children, and the year.8 As discussed further below, M axEIT C
reflects exogenous policy variation that is independent of family income or actual receipt of
the EITC, which are both endogenous with respect to work behavior.
We use the following differences-in-differences style regression to estimate the effects
of EITC expansions on various time-allocation outcomes, Yist , separately for married and
unmarried mothers:
0
Yist = α1 M axEIT Cist · M arist + α2 M axEIT Cist · U nmarist + Xist
α3 + γs + γt + ist , (1)

where subscript i refers to mother, s to state of residence, and t to year. M arist is an
indicator equal to one for married mothers, while U nmarist = 1 − M arist is an indicator
equal to one for unmarried mothers. The vector Xist contains a rich set of potentially timevarying individual-level controls, including indicators for the number of children, and annual
state-level factors reflecting the underlying economic and policy environment. We show that
results are robust to various subsets of these controls as well as including state-specific time
trends, state-specific time trends by marital status, and interacting annual state factors with
marital status and children. State and year fixed effects (FE) are denoted by γs and γt ,
respectively. The idiosyncratic error, ist , is assumed to be independent of M axEIT C and
marital status, conditional on other covariates Xist , as well as state and year FE. We report
8

M axEIT C is highly correlated with other aspects of the EITC and does a good job of capturing EITC
expansions over time. For example, regressing M axEIT C on the EITC phase-in rate—controlling for number
of children, state, and year fixed effects—yields an R2 of 0.999. We consider the phase-in rate in Section 5.9.
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standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state level.9 ATUS
weights are used in all specifications.
We also explore whether the effects vary by other family characteristics conditional on
marital status, estimating equations of the form
0
0
0
Yist = M axEIT Cist ·M arist ·Zist
β1 +M axEIT Cist ·U nmarist ·Zist
β2 +Xist
β3 +γs +γt +ist , (2)

where Zist reflects a vector of indicator variables for mothers’ race, educational attainment,
or predicted probability of low income (as described below).

4.

Data from the American Time Use Surveys
We use the 2003–2018 Bureau of Labor Statistics’ American Time Use Survey Data

(ATUS). ATUS is the “nation’s first federally administered, continuous survey on time use in
the United States. The goal of the survey is to measure how people divide their time among
life’s activities” (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2019).10 ATUS data are linked to the
Current Population Survey (CPS) and contain rich demographic and geographic information.
We keep all women ages 18–49 in the main sample, 58,090 observations. Of these women,
43,685 are mothers and 14,940 are unmarried mothers.
With the use of time diaries, ATUS asks respondents how they spent every minute of a 24hour day, also recording with whom they spent their time. We scale reported time use so that
units can be interpreted as weekly hours. We divide time use into three broad categories: paid
work activities (including work, commuting, job search, and job-related socializing); home
production; and leisure.11 All time unaccounted for by these categories can be classified as
schooling, sleep, and “uncategorized.” 12 We also determine whether time in each activity was
spent with children, creating our measure of “time with children.” Additionally, we create
9

Alternate clustering and standard error specifications yield similar results, as does restricting the sample
to unmarried mothers (available upon request).
10
Time-use data exists for earlier years, but these samples are relatively small (generally 2,000–4,000
observations per year, compared to 10,000–20,000 per year for 2003–2018) and contain fewer covariates.
11
Home production includes cooking and meal preparation, housework, car maintenance, taking care of
garden or pets, travel related to household activities, other household management, taking care of children
or other household members, and shopping. Leisure time includes exercise and sports, games, watching TV
or movies, computer activity, socializing, talking on the phone or communicating, reading, listening to music
or the radio, arts and entertainment, hobbies educational activities, and own medical care.
12
The mean value of uncategorized time is only 1.36 hours, out of 168 weekly hours.
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a measure of “investment” time, a subset of leisure and home production activities in which
the mother was with her child. Investment time includes activities like doing homework
and children’s education, providing and obtaining medical care, playing games or sports,
doing crafts, or attending museums or events together. See the Data Appendix for complete
details.
To measure labor supply, we have a few options available, some based on ATUS timediary data and others based on linked CPS data. Our preferred measures are labor force
participation (LFP, an indicator equal to one if employed or unemployed) and hours worked
last week, both from CPS survey data. We use these CPS-based measures unless otherwise
specified; however, results are qualitatively similar across measures.13
For time-use activities not specifically related to time with children (e.g., working, home
production, leisure), we often study the full sample of women, since the largest incentive
differences from EITC changes are between women with and without children. Between
these two groups, the EITC’s effect on labor supply and time-use will be most detectable.
For outcomes related to spending time with children, we focus exclusively on mothers with
children in the household.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for all women, all mothers, and unmarried women ages
18–49 (using ATUS weights). On average, women have 1.2 children, are 33.8 years old, 52
percent are married, 89 and 33 percent finished high school and college, 13 and 17 percent are
black or Hispanic, and have $26,000 and $66,000 in individual and total household earnings.
Average M axEIT C is $3,337, while the average EITC benefits women are actually eligible
for is $668, with 24 percent receiving some benefits.14 Compared to the sample of all women,
mothers are on average older, are more likely to be married, have lower education, are more
likely to be nonwhite, are less likely to be employed, and have lower individual earnings
but similar levels of household earnings. Compared to all mothers, unmarried mothers are
on average more socially and economically disadvantaged: younger with lower education,
13

As already discussed, ATUS also asks about time spent on work activities, but this measure is noisier,
since it is based on a 24-hour period, which may occur on a weekend day. Other available measures of labor
supply in the CPS include employed and usual weekly work hours.
14
EITC benefits imputed from NBER’s TAXSIM (Feenberg and Coutts, 1993). Details here: https:
//www.nber.org/taxsim/.
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more likely to be nonwhite, eligible for more EITC benefits ($1,525 vs. $1,079), and more
likely to be eligible for at least some benefits (51 vs. 35 percent). We also report summary
statistics for the state-year variables we control for in our analysis (discussed in Section 5.1):
state GDP growth rate, state per capita GDP, state unemployment rate, minimum wage,
maximum welfare benefits for a family with 1, 2, 3, or 4 children.
Table 2 uses the sample of mothers and reports summary statistics for time-use variables.
Among all mothers, average weekly hours (from CPS) are 21.6 for work, 46.5 for home
production, 33.4 for leisure, 38.7 for time with children, and 6.0 for investment into children.
Table 2 also shows that mothers with more children spend less time on work and leisure,
while they spend more time on home production, with children, and investing in children.15
Figure 5 shows how weekly hours spent working, with children, and investing in children
vary with children’s ages. On average, mothers with infants work 15 hours per week, and
work hours steadily increase with a child’s age, reaching 20 hours by age 6 and 25 hours by
age 17. By contrast, maternal time with children monotonically decreases with a child’s age:
mothers spend about 60 hours per week with infants, falling to 40 hours by age 8 and 20
hours at age 17. We also observe a steady decline in investment time as children age, falling
from about 10 hours per week for infants to 8 hours per week at age 4, to 2 hours per week
at age 17. Figure 5 also displays the 25th and 75th percentiles for hours with children and
investing in children by age of child.

5.

Results
In this section, we first establish the exogeneity of state EITC changes. We then examine

effects of the EITC on maternal labor supply before turning to impacts on other uses of
time, including home production, leisure, and time with children. We decompose time with
children into “investment” and “non-investment” activities to better understand how changes
in the EITC might impact child development via time-use decisions. We also study whether
time-use effects of the EITC differ on weekdays vs. weekends, and whether there are differ15

In the Online Appendix, we also show the full distribution for each category of time use by number
of children. Appendix Figures A.2, A.3, and A.4 show the distribution of hours worked last week (CPS
measure), home production, and leisure. Appendix Figures A.5 and A.6 show the distribution of total hours
with children and investment hours in children.
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ential effects based on age of the mother or on the ages of children in the household. Finally,
we explore the robustness of our estimates to different sets of controls and specifications that
leverage variation from state vs. federal EITC expansions.

5.1.

Exogeneity of State EITCs

To examine whether EITC policy expansions are correlated with other state policies or
economic conditions, we regress measures of state EITCs on several state-year characteristics,
including GDP, unemployment rate, the top marginal income tax rate, the minimum wage,
welfare generosity for families with 1, 2, or 3 or more children, and sales tax rates. We also
include lags of each of these variables along with state and year FE.
In Table 3, we find that across four specifications and dozens of variables, only two
estimates are significant at the 10 percent level. The four specifications are combinations of
using the sample of all states or states that ever had a state EITC, and of using maximum
state EITC benefits or the state EITC rate as outcomes. Testing for the joint significance
of these state-level traits yields p-values between 0.85 and 0.95.16 Although we find little
evidence that these traits are associated with state EITCs, we control for these state-level
traits throughout our analysis.

5.2.

Labor Supply

We begin our analysis of time allocation decisions by studying the impact of the EITC
on labor supply, earnings, and family resources.
Among all women, Table 4 Panel A shows that a $1,000 increase in M axEIT C increases
average labor force participation (1.7 percentage points), weekly work hours (0.74), earnings
($1,166), and EITC benefits ($245). Here, work hours refers to hours worked last week, as
reported in CPS data. By marital status, Table 4 Panel B shows larger estimated effects
among unmarried women on LFP (3 percentage points), weekly work hours (1.2), earnings
($1,597), EITC benefits ($301), and the probability of being eligible for any EITC benefits
(1.9 percentage points). Among married women, we find insignificant effects, except on
16

Contrary to these results, there is some evidence that state economic conditions or policies were associated with state EITC expansions in the 1990s (e.g., Hoynes and Patel (2018)).
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EITC benefits ($188).17 These differences by marital status are all statistically significant
(p-values < 0.001) and are largely consistent with previous evidence on how the EITC affects
unmarried and married mothers (Eissa and Hoynes, 2006; Bastian and Jones, 2019).18
Restricting the sample to mothers, estimates in Table 4 Panel C are very similar to
(though less precise than) estimates in Panel B based on all women. For unmarried mothers, each $1,000 increase in M axEIT C raises LFP (2.4 percentage points), hours worked
last week (0.83), earnings ($1,222), and EITC benefits ($361). For married mothers, results are all insignificant, except for EITC benefits ($238). Appendix Table A.1, presents
a similar pattern of results for subgroups of mothers by marital status interacted with race
or educational attainment (based on estimating equation (2)). Impacts are generally larger
and often significant for unmarried mothers, regardless of race and education, while impacts
are mostly small and statistically insignificant for all types of married mothers (except for
positive effects on EITC benefits).
The labor supply results presented thus far are based on CPS data on LFP and hours
worked last week. Appendix Table A.2 shows that results are robust to studying other
measures of labor supply from the CPS (usual weekly work hours, employed, and nonself-employed LFP) or from time diary data from ATUS (weekly work hours, working > 0
hours/week, working ≥ 20 hours/week, and working ≥ 40 hours/week).
In Appendix Table A.3 we isolate the effects of state EITC expansions by limiting the
sample to years before or after the 2009 federal EITC expansion. In these specifications,
variation in M axEIT C comes exclusively from state EITC expansions. We find that both
before and after 2009, EITC expansions are associated with increases in LFP and weekly
hours worked among unmarried mothers, while effects for married mothers are much weaker
and mostly insignificant. These results also highlight that our estimates are not driven by
changes in labor supply associated with the Great Recession.
17

Increases in EITC benefits are due to a mechanical and behavioral component. Even with no change in
labor supply, increases in M axEIT C will lead to increased EITC benefits by those already receiving it.
18
Our study implictly addresses Kleven (2019) and his claim that the EITC does not impact labor supply
in two main ways: one, we focus on 2003–2018, well after welfare reform, ensuring that our EITC estimates
are not confounded with the simultaneity of 1990s EITC expansions and welfare reform; and two, by using
time-use outcomes, we provide an alternate approach to testing whether the EITC impacted mothers.
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5.3.

Effects on Broad Categories of Time Allocation

Based on the labor supply results in Table 4, we expect to find that the EITC led to
reductions in the amount of time unmarried mothers spend on non-work activities and that
the EITC had little effect on the time-use of married mothers. In Table 5, we divide each
woman’s 168 weekly hours into home production, leisure, work activities, school, sleep, and
“uncategorized” using the ATUS time diary activity data.
For unmarried women, Panel A shows that $1,000 in M axEIT C reduces home production
and leisure (1.04 and 0.74 hours), increases work activities (1.50 hours), and has little effect
on school, sleep, and uncategorized time. For married mothers, whose labor supply is largely
unaffected by the EITC, we see insignificant effects on other uses of time as well.
Panel B reveals similar patterns for the sample of mothers; however, estimated effects
on work activities are muted for unmarried mothers relative to all unmarried women. Consequently, we also estimate more muted impacts on their other uses of time. Among single
mothers, a $1,000 increase in M axEIT C increases work activities by 0.63 hours per week
and reduces home production by 0.91 hours per week and leisure by 0.40 hours per week.
For married mothers, all impacts are statistically and economically insignificant.

5.4.

Time with Children and Parental Time Investment in Children

We now look specifically at how mothers spend their time with children. Table 5 Panel
B decomposes home production and leisure into time with and without children.19 Among
unmarried mothers, each $1,000 in M axEIT C reduces home production and leisure time
with children (−1.17 and −0.53 hours per week) but has small and insignificant effects on
home production and leisure time without children (0.26 and 0.12 hours per week).
Tables A.6 and A.7 decompose the reduction in home production and leisure time with
children (for unmarried mothers) into eight subcategories. Table A.6 shows that $1,000 in
M axEIT C leads to statistically significant reductions in personal care (0.11 hours), housework (0.23 hours), and traveling/errands (0.19 hours). Reductions in waiting and shopping
19

Time with children is not a mutually exclusive category, but rather overlaps with the other categories
shown in Table 5. We do not decompose work, school, sleep, or uncategorized time into with/without
children, because time with children is negligible for these activities and pre-2010 ATUS did not collect “with
who” information when respondents reported sleeping, grooming, personal/private activities, or working.

12

(0.19 hours) are also substantial, though statistically insignificant. (We estimate negligible
effects on all remaining home production subcategories.) Table A.7 shows that the entire
reduction in leisure time with children comes from time spent socializing and relaxing.
Since the EITC reduces time that mothers spend with their children, it is natural to worry
about impacts for parental time investments (e.g., reading together, help with homework,
playing, doctor visits) and child development. Of course, reductions in time mothers spend
with children may not have much of an effect on child development if this time would have
been spent watching television, cleaning the house, etc. To investigate this issue, Table 6
decomposes maternal time spent with children into investment and non-investment activities.
Each $1,000 in M axEIT C reduces total time unmarried mothers spend with children by
1.61 hours per week, but this decrease is explained completely by non-investment time, which
declines by 1.56 hours per week. This reduction in non-investment time with children comes
more out of home production time (0.9 hours per week) than leisure (0.75 hours per week),
but reductions in both are significant.
Although changes in total time spent on investment are negligible, this does not necessarily mean that mothers do not adjust their time across different types of investment activities.
Given the changes in family income induced by EITC expansions, parents may adjust the
types of investment activities they engage in depending on the income elasticities of the
activities. These elasticities may differ, for example, because of different complementarities
with purchased goods and services or due to heterogeneous parental preferences for different
types of activities (e.g., parents may enjoy some activities more than others).
We consider the impacts of EITC expansions on the investment subcategories of academic, health, and “other” investment time. Table 6 shows very small and insignificant
effects of M axEIT C on academic investment time, modest but statistically significant reductions in health investment time, and offsetting (but mostly insignificant) increases in
“other” investment time. Appendix Table A.8 shows that the reductions in health investment reflect less time spent providing and obtaining medical care for children. This may
reflect improvements in health that have previously been attributed to the EITC (Hoynes
et al., 2015; Averett and Wang, 2018; Braga et al., 2019) such that children require less
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medical attention.20 Appendix Table A.8 also shows that increases in “other” investment
time are entirely explained by increases in time spent playing (0.24 and 0.16 hours per week
for unmarried and married mothers, respectively). The sizeable impacts on play time for
married mothers suggests that these responses may be due to the increased family income
associated with EITC expansions. This might be expected if parents view time spent playing
with children as a luxury.21

5.5.

EITC Effects on the Distribution of Time Use

We now briefly consider the impacts of EITC expansions on the distributions of weekly
hours of work, home production, leisure, time with children, and time investing in children.
Specifically, we estimate the effects of the EITC on the probability that unmarried mothers
spend more than x hours per week on an activity using the following specification:
0
1(Yist > x) = δ1 M axEIT Cist ·M arist +δ2 M axEIT Cist ·U nmarist +Xist
δ3 +γs +γt +ist . (3)

In Figure 6, we restrict the sample to mothers. Panels A–D show that an increase in
M axEIT C raises the probability of working up to—but not above—40 hours per week.
Thus, the EITC draws women into the labor market but does not increase work beyond full
time. An increase in M axEIT C significantly reduces home production time in the 50–90
hours per week range, while it only reduces leisure time at the low end of the distribution
(10–20 hours per week). The EITC reduces time spent with children throughout much of
the distribution; however, investment time decreases most for the 1–30 hours range, while
effects are negligible for mothers who spend more than 40 hours per week on investment.22

5.6.

Weekends vs. Weekdays

Because the EITC increases work among unmarried mothers, these mothers must reallocate the rest of their time accordingly. Since most jobs are Monday to Friday, we may expect
20

For example, increases in family income or employment may lead to improvements in health insurance.
Indeed, Krueger et al. (2009) find that parents enjoy time spent playing with their children relative to
nearly any other activity they study. The larger increase in time spent playing for married mothers is also
consistent with modest negative impacts of the EITC on their labor supply. While we do not find a negative
effect on the average labor supply of married mothers, we do find a decrease among younger married mothers
in Section 5.7, lining up with previous studies (Eissa and Hoynes, 2004; Bastian and Jones, 2019).
22
Appendix Figure A.7 shows very similar effects on the distribution of hours of work, home production,
and leisure for the sample of all women.
21
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a larger impact on weekday relative to weekend time use. We do not rescale time use here,
so effects should still be interpreted as weekly hours.23 In Table 7, we explore the EITC’s
impacts on weekend and weekday time spent on work, home production, and leisure, as well
as time spent with children. Panel A pools women interviewed on weekends and weekdays
(results shown in previous tables), while Panels B and C restrict the sample to women who
were interviewed on weekdays or weekends.
For unmarried mothers, columns 1 and 2 show that $1,000 in M axEIT C increases weekday work activities by 2.1 hours each week, while it reduces home production and leisure
(combined) by 2.5 hours over the work week. Estimated effects are more muted and less
precise when the sample is restricted to mothers (columns 3 and 4). Columns 5–7 show
that unmarried mothers spend 2.5 fewer hours with children during weekdays, almost exclusively made up of non-investment time. Effects on the weekend are generally much smaller
and statistically insignificant, although, in most cases, they suggest responses that partially
compensate for adjustments made during the work week.

5.7.

Heterogeneous Effects by Mothers’ Age

We next explore whether there are important differences in the way younger vs. older
mothers respond to changes in the EITC, since they have differential labor market experience,
attachment, and opportunity costs.
In Figure 7, we allow the effects of the EITC to vary by age for unmarried and married mothers by replacing M axEIT C · M ar and M axEIT C · U nmar in Equation (1) with
P
P
a M axEIT C · M ar · 1(Age ∈ a) and
a M axEIT C · U nmar · 1(Age ∈ a), where a represents six age categories: 18–25, 26–30, 31–35, 36–40, 41–45, and 46–50. The outcomes in
Panels A, B, and C are LFP, time with kids, and investment into kids.
Among unmarried mothers, the EITC has a larger effect on both LFP and time with
children for younger mothers. Each $1,000 increase in M axEIT C increases LFP by 2.4
percentage points for younger mothers and 1.8 percentage points for older mothers (results
are not significantly different). Consistent with these adjustments in work behavior, among
23

Recall that ATUS asks respondents how they spent every minute of a 24-hour day and that we rescale
time-use so that units can be interpreted as weekly hours.
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younger mothers we observe reductions of over two hours per week spent with children and
insignificant effects on child investment. Among older mothers, effects on time with children
are smaller and close to zero for mothers over age 40. While statistically insignificant, we
find a small increase in investment among older mothers, consistent with positive income
effects and no offsetting reduction in their non-work time budget.
The effects for married mothers reveals an interesting pattern: for young married mothers
under age 25, the EITC has a negative effect on LFP and a positive effect on time with—
and investment into—children; while the EITC has a marginally significant effect on those
aged 26-30 and null effects on those over age 30. The effects on younger married mothers
are consistent with previous research finding small negative effects on the labor supply of
married mothers (Eissa and Hoynes, 2004; Bastian and Jones, 2019).

5.8.

Heterogeneous Effects by Children’s Age

Since mothers typically spend progressively more time working and less time with children
as their children grow older (see Figure 5), we next explore whether responses to EITC
expansions depend on children’s ages. To do so, we consider the effects of total time spent
a
, by estimating separate
with children in age group a (i.e., ages 0–2, 3–5,..., 18–20, 21–22), Yist

regressions for different age groups as follows:
a
0
Yist
= φa1 M axEIT Cist · M arist + φa2 M axEIT Cist · U nmarist + Xist
φa3 + γsa + γta + aist . (4)

Here, φa1 and φa2 reflect the impact of a $1,000 increase in the maximum EITC benefit on
hours with (or investing in) children who are in age group a for married and unmarried
mothers, respectively. By definition, these effects reflect impacts for mothers with at least
one child in age group a.24 Most children older than 18 are not EITC-eligible, unless they are
full-time students or disabled. However, we consider children up through age 22 as quasiplacebo tests, since any effects for these (mostly ineligible) children would likely indicate
spurious effects of unmeasured factors.
Figure 8 reports the effects of M axEIT C on time spent with and investing in children
of each age. A $1,000 increase in the maximum EITC benefit significantly increases mara
Each regression uses the full sample of mothers with Yist
= 0 for mothers with no children in age group
a. Xist contains the full set of controls.
24
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ried mothers’ time spent with and investing in children ages 3–11: time spent with these
young children increases by 0.6–1.3 hours per week (Panel A), while time spent investing
increases by about one-third of an hour (Panel B). The same increase in M axEIT C significantly reduces the time unmarried mothers spend with children ages 6–14 by about an hour
(Panel A); however, it has no significant effects on their investment time with children of
any age (Panel B). Finally, we note that effects on time spent with (or investing in) children
ages 21–22 are both negligible and insignificant, consistent with their ineligibility for EITC
(in most cases).

5.9.

Robustness

In this section, we examine whether our results are robust to alternate sets of controls,
alternate measures of the EITC, and whether mothers with the highest predicted probability
of having low income are most affected by EITC policy changes.25
Alternate Controls: In Tables 8 and 9, we test whether our main results are robust
to various sets of controls. Columns 1–3 progressively add year, state, and number of kids
FE; demographic traits; whether the time-use data was collected on a weekend or weekday;
and measured state-year factors (e.g., unemployment rate, minimum wage). Column 3 is
the full set of controls used for all results above. Columns 4–6 examine whether the results
are robust to progressively adding controls for state-specific time trends, state-specific time
trends interacted with an indicator for unmarried, and state-year factors interacted with
indicators for unmarried and having any children. These controls account for general trends
in unobserved state-specific factors by marital status and allow for measured state policies
and economic conditions to differentially affect time allocation decisions by marital status
and children in the household. Finally, column 7 adds state × year FE, which largely
absorbs variation in state EITC expansions and identifies the impact of the 2009 federal
EITC expansion, while column 8 adds year × number of children FE, largely absorbing
variation in the federal expansion (and other nationwide trends that differentially affect
families of different sizes), identifying the impact of state EITC expansions.
Table 8 uses the sample of all women and examines the following outcomes: LFP, weekly
25

When we separately estimate effects of the EITC by month, we find similar results across months.
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work hours, and home production plus leisure hours. Across controls, the estimated effect
on LFP for unmarried women ranges from 3.0 to 3.9 percentage points; estimated effect on
weekly work hours ranges from 0.9 to 1.6; and the effect on home production and leisure
ranges from −1.6 to −2.2 hours. Among married mothers, all specifications show consistent
evidence that the EITC has little impact on labor supply, while there is a modest reduction
in home production and leisure time.
Table 9 uses the sample of mothers and examines the same three outcomes from Table 8,
as well as time with children and time investing in children. Results for the first three outcomes are similar to but more muted and less precise than those in Table 8. For unmarried
mothers, the estimated effects on time with children range from −1.2 to −2.2 hours per
week across all specifications, while estimated effects on time investing in children are consistently very small and statistically insignificant. Among married mothers, all estimates are
insignificant.
Comparing columns 7 and 8 in both Tables 8 and 9 suggests that the 2009 federal EITC
expansion had larger effects on labor supply, home production and leisure, and time with
children than did state EITC expansions (for unmarried mothers).
Alternate Measures of the EITC: Table A.5 shows that results are robust to alternate
measures of EITC expansions, specifically the EITC phase-in rate.26 We find consistent
evidence that EITC expansions lead to increases in LFP and work hours, coupled with
reductions in home production and leisure time, for unmarried women and mothers. The
expansions also cause unmarried mothers to reduce their total time with children but have
little impact on their investment time with children. Among married women and mothers,
our estimates suggest no effect of changes in EITC phase-in rates on their time allocation.
Subgroups Based on Predicted Household Income: We have shown how the
EITC’s impact varies by marital status, race, and education. In general, more economically disadvantaged mothers (e.g., unmarried, nonwhite, less educated) are more responsive
to changes in the EITC. To better examine the role of economic disadvantage, we now take
26

Notice that if the federal phase in rate is 40 percent and the state EITC matches 20 percent of the
federal EITC, then the total phase-in rate is 0.40(1+0.20)=0.48. M axEIT C and phase-in rate are highly
correlated; see footnote 8.
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into account several (exogenous) demographic factors to predict which mothers are most
likely to have low household income (i.e., income less than $20,000 in 2017 dollars).27 These
women are most likely to find themselves on the phase-in or plateau regions of the EITC
schedule, encouraging their labor supply. Dividing mothers into terciles based on their predicted probability of low income, we estimate Equation (2) using these predicted probability
terciles as Zist variables interacted with M axEIT C and marital status. (Results are similar if we estimate a specification that only interacts the predicted probability terciles with
M axEIT C, estimating an average effect across married and unmarried mothers.)28
Table 10 shows consistent evidence that mothers with the highest predicted probability
of having low household income are most affected by changes in the EITC. For unmarried
mothers, we estimate positive effects on LFP and negative effects on time with children and
time spent in home production or leisure for each tercile, with consistently larger effects for
mothers that are more likely to be economically disadvantaged. Among unmarried mothers
that are most likely to have low household income, each $1,000 increase in maximum EITC
benefits raises LFP by 3 percentage points, while it lowers home production and leisure
combined by 2.0 hours per week and reduces time with children by 2.1 hours per week.
Importantly, none of our subgroups of unmarried mothers respond by reducing investment
time with their children (results are negative, but small and insignificant).
Among married mothers, we find little evidence of any effects, except for a modest increase
in investment time with children among those least likely to be of low income. Altogether,
these results suggest that marital status is important even when conditioning on predicted
household income.
27

Specifically, we use OLS to estimate the probability that mothers have household income less than
$20,000 (in 2017 dollars) controlling for number of children FE, four categories of mothers’ educational
attainment (<12, =12, 13–15, and >16), race, age, and birth year, as well as year and state FE. While we
do not use marital status to predict low income, it is strongly correlated with other traits associated with
economic disadvantage. As such, we find that 44 percent of unmarried mothers vs. 25 percent of married
mothers are in the high-predicted-probability tercile.
28
Women with the lowest predicted probability of low household income have less than a 0.12 probability,
while those in the highest tercile have a probability greater than 0.24. We note that results are similar when
using alternate sets of controls and other low-income cutoffs, or when using probit or logit estimators to
estimate the predicted probability of low income.
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6.

Conclusions
Using data from the 2003–2018 ATUS, we study the effect of the 2009 federal EITC

expansion and several state EITC expansions on maternal time allocation decisions. Our
results provide strong evidence that recent expansions in the EITC increase maternal work
time, while reducing time allocated to home production and leisure activities. These impacts
are concentrated among unmarried and otherwise economically disadvantaged women, with
our results on labor supply largely confirming the prior literature that considered earlier
expansions of the EITC.
Our more novel contribution lies in our analysis of maternal time allocation at home, in
particular time spent with children. We find robust evidence that unmarried mothers respond
to increases in the EITC by scaling back time with their children, especially primary-schoolaged children. In particular, unmarried mothers spend less time engaging in activities like
personal care, housework, and relaxing when with their children. Importantly, they do not
devote less time to active learning and development activities like reading or helping with
homework, and they spend more time playing with their children. Among all the investmentrelated activities we examine, only time spent providing and obtaining medical care declines
in response to EITC expansions. We suspect that this reflects diminished need for medical
services due to health benefits associated with higher incomes and/or greater health care
access (Hoynes et al., 2015; Braga et al., 2019; Averett and Wang, 2018).
Since labor supply among all but young (ages 18–25) married mothers is not impacted by
the EITC expansions we study, it is no surprise that their time devoted to other activities also
remains largely unaffected. That said, we observe modest increases in time spent with young
children. Modest (though statistically insignificant) increases in their time spent playing with
children are largely offset by reductions in time devoted to medical care, further suggesting
that these same effects for unmarried mothers may be driven by improvements in family
finances. If true, policies or economic changes that directly impact family resources may
lead to important reallocations of parental time within the household even if they do not
affect the amount of time parents spend outside of the home.
Altogether, our results suggest that while expansions of the EITC draw single mothers
20

into the labor market and away from their children, the adverse developmental consequences
of this are likely to be quite limited, since reductions in time spent with children do not
appear to be very investment-oriented. Indeed, as several studies document (Dahl and
Lochner, 2012, 2017; Chetty et al., 2011; Bastian and Michelmore, 2018; Manoli and Turner,
2018; Agostinelli and Sorrenti, 2018), the benefits for children from greater financial resources
appear to dominate any potential adverse impacts of reductions in non-investment time.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Sample:

All
Women

All
Mothers

Unmarried
Mothers

Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Children
1.20 1.25 1.96 1.03 1.85 1.08
Age
33.78 9.26 34.39 8.52 30.23 9.29
Birth Year
1976.5 10.5 1975.9 9.7 1980.3 10.4
Married
0.52 0.50 0.63 0.48 0.00 0.00
HS Graduate
0.89 0.32 0.86 0.35 0.80 0.40
Some College
0.63 0.48 0.59 0.49 0.47 0.50
College Graduate
0.33 0.47 0.30 0.46 0.13 0.33
Black
0.13 0.34 0.14 0.34 0.25 0.43
Hispanic
0.17 0.38 0.21 0.41 0.23 0.42
Employed
0.71 0.45 0.66 0.47 0.67 0.47
Individual Earnings (2018 $) 25,783 30,627 23,286 30,168 18,538 23,147
Household Earnings (2018 $) 65,848 48,216 65,920 48,463 46,315 41,475
Maximum Possible EITC
3,337 2,468 5,106 1,364 4,861 1,377
EITC Benefit Eligibility
668 1,521 1,079 1,827 1,525 1,959
EITC Eligible
0.24 0.43 0.35 0.48 0.51 0.50
State GDP Growth Rate
4.03 2.82 4.05 2.87 4.01 2.78
State GDP (billions of 2018 $) 13.18 0.96 13.19 0.96 13.20 0.95
State Unemployment Rate
6.21 2.10 6.22 2.09 6.28 2.11
State Minimum Wage (2018 $) 8.05 1.12 8.04 1.11 8.05 1.11
Max TANF 1 Kid
409.8 166.1 408.9 167.4 401.6 166.9
Max TANF 2 Kids
506.1 206.4 504.6 207.8 496.7 208.0
Max TANF 3 Kids
597.3 243.8 595.3 245.3 586.5 246.9
Observations
58,090
43,685
14,940
Notes: 2003–2018 ATUS data. Sample includes all women aged 18–49. EITC data
from NBER and IRS. EITC benefits calculated using TAXSIM. Unemployment rates
from BLS. GDP from BEA regional data. Minimum wage from the Tax Policy Center’s Tax Facts. Welfare benefits from the Urban Institute’s Welfare Rules Database.
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Table 2: Weekly Hours Spent on Different Activities, by Number of Children
All
Mothers

Mean
Activity
(1)
Work (CPS)
21.6
Home Production
46.5
with Children
22.0
Not with Children
24.4
Leisure
33.4
with Children
15.6
Not with Children
17.8
Total Hours with Children 38.7
Investment into Children 6.0
Observations

S.D.
(2)
19.5
23.7
21.0
18.1
22.1
18.4
19.5
31.7
10.1

43,685

Mothers
with 1
Child
Mean
(3)
23.9
41.3
15.4
26.0
34.7
13.2
21.6
29.3
4.3

S.D.
(4)
19.5
22.2
17.9
18.8
22.8
18.0
21.4
30.0
9.0

17,012

Mothers
with 2
Children
Mean
(5)
21.8
48.2
24.6
23.6
32.7
16.7
16.0
42.5
6.9

S.D.
(6)
19.4
23.3
20.6
17.3
21.5
18.3
17.7
30.5
10.5

17,144

Mothers
with 3+
Children
Mean
(7)
16.9
53.3
30.4
22.9
32.1
18.3
13.8
50.2
7.9

S.D.
(8)
18.8
25.0
23.1
17.6
21.5
18.7
17.0
31.7
11.1

9,529

Notes: 2003–2018 ATUS data. Sample includes all mothers aged 18–49. All measures
based on ATUS time-diary data except work hours, which are based on hours worked last
week in CPS.
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Table 3: Testing the Exogeneity of State EITCs
Sample:

All States

Ever Had a State EITC

Outcome:

Max State State EITC Max State State EITC
EITC Benefits
Rate
EITC Benefits
Rate
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
State Min Wage (2017 $)
-0.0043
-0.00020
0.0028
0.00098
(0.015)
(0.0023)
(0.022)
(0.0037)
Lag State Min Wage
0.0070
0.0025
0.0077
0.0024
(0.018)
(0.0028)
(0.024)
(0.0039)
State Unemp Rate
0.00057
-0.00032
0.0073
0.00092
(0.019)
(0.0031)
(0.034)
(0.0055)
Lag State Unemp Rate
-0.0076
-0.00051
-0.0049
0.000094
(0.022)
(0.0035)
(0.038)
(0.0063)
State GDP Growth Rate
-0.0031
-0.00071
-0.022
-0.0037
(0.0054)
(0.00089)
(0.016)
(0.0027)
Lag State GDP Growth Rate
-0.00028
-0.00017
-0.0026
-0.00065
(0.0027)
(0.00044)
(0.0060)
(0.0010)
Log State GDP
0.23
0.023
2.25
0.32
(0.41)
(0.066)
(1.62)
(0.27)
Lag Log State GDP
-0.41
-0.045
-2.41
-0.34
(0.47)
(0.075)
(1.79)
(0.30)
Max TANF with 1 Child
-0.0034
-0.00064*
-0.0065
-0.0012
(0.0022)
(0.00037)
(0.0044)
(0.00076)
Lag Max TANF with 1 Child
-0.0018
-0.00023
-0.00078 -0.00000075
(0.0017)
(0.00027)
(0.0020)
(0.00034)
Max TANF with 2 Children
0.0037
0.00064*
0.0061
0.0011
(0.0025)
(0.00038)
(0.0042)
(0.00071)
Lag Max TANF with 2 Children
0.0030
0.00046
0.0030
0.00041
(0.0020)
(0.00030)
(0.0019)
(0.00031)
Max TANF with 3 Children
-0.00081
-0.00013
-0.00067
-0.000071
(0.00090)
(0.00013)
(0.0013)
(0.00022)
Lag Max TANF with 3 Children
-0.0012
-0.00019
-0.0018
-0.00029
(0.00096)
(0.00014)
(0.0012)
(0.00018)
Testing Joint Significance (p-val.)
R-squared
Observations
Mean Dep Var
State, Year FE
State Time Trends

0.947
0.950
761
0.44
X
X

0.897
0.953
761
0.073
X
X

0.935
0.921
404
0.82
X
X

0.852
0.924
404
0.14
X
X

Notes: EITC data from NBER and IRS. Unemployment rates from BLS. GDP from BEA regional data.
Minimum wage from the Tax Policy Center’s Tax Facts. Welfare benefits from the Urban Institute’s
Welfare Rules Database. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4: Labor Supply, Earnings, and EITC Benefits
Outcome:

LFP

Weekly EITC
Any Earnings Earnings
Work Benefits EITC
and EITC
Hours
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Panel A: Average Effects (Sample of All Women, N=58,090)
MaxEITC
0.017** 0.74** 244.7*** 0.0042 1166.4** 1411.2***
(0.0081) (0.35) (49.3) (0.010) (385.4) (379.6)
R-squared
0.099 0.158 0.330
0.320
0.238
0.229
Panel B: Effects by Marital Status (Sample of All Women, N=58,090)
MaxEITC ×
0.0050 0.27 188.2*** -0.010 732.4* 920.6**
Married
(0.0086) (0.35) (47.5) (0.011) (396.2) (384.2)
MaxEITC ×
0.030*** 1.20*** 300.9*** 0.019** 1597.3*** 1898.2***
Unmarried
(0.0073) (0.35) (44.0) (0.0088) (386.6) (379.0)
R-squared
0.104 0.161 0.337
0.326
0.239
0.230
Eq. Eff. (p-val.)
0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Panel C: Effects by Marital Status (Sample of Mothers, N=43,685)
MaxEITC ×
-0.0060 -0.24 238.0*** 0.0052
423.4
661.4
Married
(0.011) (0.44) (36.2) (0.0092) (538.7) (532.1)
MaxEITC ×
0.024** 0.83** 360.6*** 0.020** 1222.0** 1582.6***
Unmarried
(0.0093) (0.37) (35.0) (0.0089) (511.0) (514.8)
R-squared
0.093
Eq. Eff. (p-val.)
0.000
Mean Dep Var (All Women) 0.78
Mean Dep Var (Mothers)
0.74

0.131
0.000
23.2
21.6

0.284
0.000
668.0
1021.9

0.291
0.000
0.24
0.34

0.213
0.000
25782.9
23514.9

0.200
0.000
26450.8
24536.9

Notes: 2003–2018 ATUS data. Sample includes all women aged 18–49. Full set of controls from
Table 8 column 3 used in each regression. Outcomes are based on CPS data. Standard errors are
robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5: The EITC and Decomposing All 168 Weekly Hours of Time Use
Outcome:

Home Production

Leisure

Work School Sleep Uncat.

With Children?
Panel
MaxEITC ×
Married
MaxEITC ×
Unmarried

Yes
No
Yes No
(1)
(2)
(3) (4) (5) (6)
(7)
(8)
(9) (10)
A: Effects by Marital Status (Sample of All Women, N=58,090)
-0.47
-0.45
0.77 0.084 -0.024 0.096
(0.49)
(0.38)
(0.46) (0.29) (0.28) (0.069)
-1.04**
-0.74*
1.50*** 0.021 0.20 0.062
(0.47)
(0.42)
(0.46) (0.27) (0.32) (0.081)

R-squared
0.158
0.105
0.173
Eq. Eff. (p-val.) 0.006
0.104
0.134
Mean Dep. Var. 41.7
34.2
26.1
Panel B: Effects by Marital Status (Sample of Mothers,
MaxEITC ×
-0.33 -0.023 -0.31 -0.069 -0.15 0.084 0.055
Married
(0.61) (0.40) (0.38) (0.51) (0.37) (0.45) (0.72)
MaxEITC ×
-0.91* -1.17*** 0.26 -0.40 -0.53 0.12 0.63
Unmarried
(0.51) (0.34) (0.35) (0.56) (0.36) (0.54) (0.61)
R-squared
0.117
Eq. Eff. (p-val.) 0.007
Mean Dep Var
46.5

0.118 0.094 0.011
0.464 0.115 0.941
3.10 61.4 1.36
N=43,685)
0.10 0.23 0.010
(0.27) (0.36) (0.086)
0.18 0.49 0.014
(0.29) (0.48) (0.11)

0.222 0.077 0.111 0.144 0.141 0.157 0.133 0.112 0.024
0.000 0.002 0.132 0.007 0.862 0.045 0.470 0.081 0.937
22.0 24.4 33.4 15.6 17.8 23.5 2.18 60.9 1.49

Notes: 2003–2018 ATUS data. Sample includes all women aged 18–49. Standard errors are robust
to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state level. The six categories are mutually exclusive and
add to 168 weekly hours. Work, school, sleep, and uncategorized time are not decomposed into
with/without children, since most of this time is not with children and since pre-2010 ATUS did
not collect “with who” information when respondents reported sleeping, grooming, personal/private
activities, or working. Full set of controls from Table 8 column 3 used in each regression. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6: Time With Children: Investment and Non-Investment Time (Sample of Mothers)
Outcome:

MaxEITC ×
Married
MaxEITC ×
Unmarried

Total

Non-Investment Time

Time

Total

Investment Time

Home Leisure Total Academic Health Other
Prod
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Panel A: Effects by Marital Status
-0.027 -0.31 -0.022 -0.43* 0.28
0.096 -0.12*** 0.31
(0.67) (0.50) (0.36) (0.26) (0.21) (0.091) (0.029) (0.24)
-1.61** -1.56*** -0.90*** -0.75*** -0.049 -0.081 -0.15*** 0.18
(0.61) (0.47) (0.31) (0.27) (0.19) (0.073) (0.027) (0.22)

R-squared
Eq. Eff. (p-val.)

0.259 0.231 0.208 0.119 0.105 0.068
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.000
Panel B: Effects by Marital Status and Race
MaxEITC ×
0.0086 -0.30 -0.031 -0.42 0.31
0.088
White × Married
(0.67) (0.50) (0.36) (0.26) (0.21) (0.089)
MaxEITC ×
-0.34
-0.42 0.0082 -0.54** 0.083
0.14
Nonwhite × Mar
(0.70) (0.55) (0.38) (0.27) (0.19) (0.098)
MaxEITC ×
-1.74*** -1.70*** -0.96*** -0.83*** -0.038 -0.10
White × Unmar
(0.64) (0.49) (0.33) (0.27) (0.20) (0.072)
MaxEITC ×
-1.38** -1.30*** -0.79*** -0.61** -0.080 -0.037
Nonwhite × Unmar (0.60) (0.48) (0.29) (0.28) (0.18) (0.073)
R-squared

0.259 0.232 0.208 0.119 0.106 0.068
Panel C: Effects by Marital Status and Education
MaxEITC × Married 0.97
0.52
0.45
-0.20 0.45** 0.13
× >12 Yrs Educ
(0.76) (0.62) (0.46) (0.30) (0.19) (0.088)
MaxEITC × Mar
-1.28
-1.36
-0.61
-0.73 0.085 0.053
× ≤12 Yrs Educ
(1.00) (0.83) (0.55) (0.53) (0.33) (0.13)
MaxEITC × Unmar -0.99
-0.97
-0.60 -0.57* -0.022 -0.056
× >12 Yrs Educ
(0.78) (0.66) (0.41) (0.34) (0.17) (0.070)
MaxEITC × Unmar -2.54*** -2.41*** -1.35** -1.00* -0.13
-0.12
× ≤12 Yrs Educ
(0.90) (0.80) (0.57) (0.50) (0.30) (0.12)
R-squared
Observations
Mean Dep Var

0.260 0.232 0.208 0.119 0.106 0.068
43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685
38.7
32.7
19.9
11.7
6.04
1.19

0.014
0.011

0.087
0.002

-0.12*** 0.34
(0.029) (0.24)
-0.14*** 0.087
(0.028) (0.23)
-0.15*** 0.22
(0.027) (0.23)
-0.16*** 0.12
(0.029) (0.21)
0.014

0.088

-0.084** 0.40**
(0.035) (0.20)
-0.18*** 0.21
(0.054) (0.38)
-0.11*** 0.14
(0.035) (0.18)
-0.21*** 0.19
(0.054) (0.35)
0.014 0.088
43,685 43,685
0.23
4.62

Notes: 2003–2018 ATUS data. Sample includes all 18–49 year-old women with at least one child under
age 19. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state level. Full set of
controls from Table 8 column 3 used in each regression. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 7: Time-Use Effects: Weekends vs Weekdays
Sample:

All Women

All Mothers

Outcome:

Work Home Prod. Work Home Prod. With Children
+ Leisure
+ Leisure
Total Invest
Hours Hours
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Panel A: Full Sample, Includes Weekends and Weekdays
MaxEITC ×
0.77
-0.92*
0.055
-0.40
-0.027 0.28
Married
(0.46)
(0.53)
(0.72)
(0.80)
(0.67) (0.21)
MaxEITC × 1.50*** -1.78*** 0.63
-1.32*
-1.61** -0.049
Unmarried
(0.46)
(0.51)
(0.61)
(0.71)
(0.61) (0.19)
R-squared
0.184
0.159
0.157
0.122
0.259 0.105
Observations 58,090
58,090 43,685 43,685
43,685 43,685
Mean Dep Var 26.1
76.0
23.5
79.9
38.7
6.04
Panel B: Restricting Sample to Weekdays (Monday–Friday)
MaxEITC ×
0.99
-1.32
-0.36
-0.27
-0.46 0.28
Married
(0.73)
(0.80)
(1.07)
(1.20)
(0.77) (0.26)
MaxEITC × 2.11*** -2.54*** 0.51
-1.59
-2.52*** -0.18
Unmarried
(0.70)
(0.73)
(0.89)
(1.11)
(0.76) (0.26)
R-squared
0.121
Observations 28,690
Mean Dep Var 32.8
Panel C: Restricting
MaxEITC ×
-0.15
Married
(0.48)
MaxEITC ×
-0.28
Unmarried
(0.53)
R-squared
0.023
Observations 29,400
Mean Dep Var 9.51

0.115
0.098
0.087
0.245 0.121
28,690 21,608 21,608
21,608 21,608
70.7
29.6
75.5
35.2
5.91
Sample to Weekends (Saturday–Sunday)
0.47
0.55
0.021
1.10
0.32
(0.60)
(0.60)
(0.70)
(1.07) (0.29)
0.50
0.59
0.017
0.56
0.28
(0.62)
(0.66)
(0.63)
(0.98) (0.23)
0.068
29,400
88.9

0.021
22,077
8.49

0.066
22,077
91.0

0.240 0.089
22,077 22,077
47.7
6.35

Notes: 2003–2018 ATUS data. Sample includes all women aged 18–49. Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state level. Full set of
controls from Table 8 column 3 used in each regression. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Table 8: Estimates Robust to Various Sets of Controls, Sample of All Women

MaxEITC ×
Married
MaxEITC ×
Unmarried
R-squared
MaxEITC ×
Married
MaxEITC ×
Unmarried

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Panel A: Outcome = Labor Force Participation (Mean = 0.78)
0.0071
0.0047 0.0050 0.0060 0.0065 0.0080 0.013 0.0070
(0.0091) (0.0090) (0.0086) (0.0079) (0.0080) (0.0088) (0.0095) (0.013)
0.031*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.033*** 0.039*** 0.032**
(0.0077) (0.0076) (0.0073) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0083) (0.0087) (0.013)
0.090
0.103
0.104
0.105
0.106
0.107
0.125 0.108
Panel B: Outcome = Weekly Work Hours (Mean = 23.2)
0.30
0.27
0.27
0.44
0.46
0.38
0.71* -0.012
(0.38)
(0.36) (0.35) (0.34) (0.34) (0.37) (0.42) (0.38)
1.19***
1.20*** 1.20*** 1.37*** 1.38*** 1.30*** 1.63*** 0.90**
(0.37)
(0.37) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.36) (0.41) (0.38)

R-squared
0.149
0.160
0.161
0.162
0.163
0.164
0.181 0.165
Panel C: Outcome = Weekly Home Production + Leisure Hours (Mean = 75.9)
MaxEITC ×
-0.69
-0.79
-0.92* -1.08** -1.01* -1.10** -1.38** -0.80
Married
(0.62)
(0.62) (0.53) (0.52) (0.51) (0.54) (0.54) (0.62)
MaxEITC ×
-1.56** -1.64*** -1.78*** -1.94*** -1.87*** -1.96*** -2.20*** -1.67**
Unmarried
(0.60)
(0.60) (0.51) (0.49) (0.49) (0.55) (0.53) (0.63)
R-squared
0.149
0.159
Controls
Year FE, State FE,
#Kids FE
X
X
Demographics
X
X
(Ed FE, Mar) × (St FE, Yr FE)
X
State-Year Factors
State Trend
State Trend × Unmarried
State-Year Factors × (Kids, Unmarried)
State FE × Year FE
Year FE × #Kids FE
Observations
58,090
58,090

0.159

0.161

0.162

0.163

0.182

0.164

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

58,090

58,090

58,090

58,090

X
58,090 58,090

Notes: 2003–2018 ATUS data. Sample includes all women aged 18–49. LFP and weekly work hours from
CPS survey data, home production and leisure hours from time-use ATUS data. Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 9: Estimates Robust to Various Sets of Controls, Sample of Mothers
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Panel A: Outcome = Labor Force Participation (Mean = 0.74)
MaxEITC ×
-0.0050 -0.0077 -0.0060 -0.0054 -0.0056 -0.0096 0.0094 -0.0039
Married
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.018)
MaxEITC ×
0.021** 0.022** 0.024** 0.024** 0.024** 0.020* 0.039*** 0.026
Unmarried
(0.010) (0.0099) (0.0093) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.018)
R-squared

0.079 0.093 0.093 0.095 0.097 0.098 0.121 0.100
Panel B: Outcome = Weekly Work Hours (Mean = 21.6)
MaxEITC ×
-0.25 -0.25
-0.24 0.0087 0.0016 -0.023 0.61
0.16
Married
(0.46) (0.45) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.43) (0.58) (0.60)
MaxEITC ×
0.74* 0.82** 0.83** 1.07*** 1.08*** 1.06*** 1.67*** 1.24**
Unmarried
(0.40) (0.38) (0.37) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.49) (0.53)
R-squared
0.116 0.131 0.131 0.133 0.134 0.135 0.157 0.137
Panel C: Outcome = Weekly Home Production + Leisure Hours (Mean = 79.9)
MaxEITC ×
-0.11 -0.20
-0.40 -0.62 -0.54 -0.27
-0.65 -0.36
Married
(0.96) (0.93) (0.80) (0.80) (0.79) (0.74) (0.85) (0.81)
MaxEITC ×
-1.00 -1.12 -1.32* -1.52** -1.45** -1.18* -1.50* -1.29
Unmarried
(0.87) (0.82) (0.71) (0.72) (0.71) (0.68) (0.76) (0.79)
R-squared
0.109 0.121 0.122 0.123 0.125 0.126 0.150 0.128
Panel D: Outcome = Weekly Hours With Children (Mean = 38.7)
MaxEITC ×
0.068
0.12 -0.027 -0.016 -0.033 -0.16
-0.68
0.30
Married
(0.73) (0.75) (0.67) (0.68) (0.67) (0.69) (0.91) (0.80)
MaxEITC ×
-1.53** -1.45** -1.61** -1.59** -1.61** -1.70** -2.21** -1.23
Unmarried
(0.68) (0.68) (0.61) (0.62) (0.62) (0.64) (0.83) (0.77)

R-squared
0.248 0.259 0.259 0.261 0.262 0.262 0.278 0.264
Panel E: Outcome = Investment Hours With Children (Mean = 6.0)
MaxEITC ×
0.35
0.30
0.28
0.35
0.34
0.33
0.22
0.46
Married
(0.24) (0.24) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.23) (0.27) (0.32)
MaxEITC ×
0.0026 -0.031 -0.049 0.017 0.0065 -0.0071 -0.11
0.13
Unmarried
(0.23) (0.22) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.23) (0.29)
R-squared
0.098 0.105 0.105 0.107 0.108 0.108 0.127 0.109
Controls in Columns 1–8 Are Identical to Those in Table 8
Observations
43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685
Notes: 2003–2018 ATUS data. Sample includes all mothers aged 18–49. LFP and weekly work
hours from CPS survey data; home production and leisure hours, hours with children, and investment with children from time-use ATUS data. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity
and clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 10: EITC Effects by Predicted Probability of Low Income
Outcome:

MaxEITC × Low
× Married
MaxEITC × Med
× Married
MaxEITC × High
× Married
MaxEITC × Low
× Unmarried
MaxEITC × Med
× Unmarried
MaxEITC × High
× Unmarried
R-squared
Observations

LFP Hours with Hours Hours Home
Children Investing Production
in Children and Leisure
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
-0.0043
0.33
0.40*
-0.28
(0.010)
(0.74)
(0.24)
(0.82)
-0.0070
-0.30
0.25
-0.42
(0.011)
(0.70)
(0.22)
(0.87)
-0.0010
-0.82
0.069
-1.33*
(0.015)
(0.78)
(0.27)
(0.99)
0.018** -1.44**
-0.13
-1.00
(0.0076) (0.66)
(0.18)
(0.70)
0.021** -2.14***
-0.21
-1.47*
(0.0095) (0.67)
(0.21)
(0.74)
0.030** -2.07***
-0.10
-2.04**
(0.013)
(0.69)
(0.24)
(0.91)
0.093
43,685

0.260
43,685

0.106
43,685

0.122
43,685

Notes: 2003–2018 ATUS data. Sample includes all mothers aged 18–49. To
create terciles (Low, Med, High) for predicted probability of low earnings, we
first regress an indicator for household earnings less than $20,000 on a set of
controls (year FE, state FE, number of kids FE, 4 education categories, black,
hispanic, age, and birth year) using ATUS weights. Then, the predicted probabilities are used to categorize individuals into terciles, where the cutoffs are
probabilities 0.12 and 0.24. Among married mothers, 40, 35, and 25 percent
are in terciles 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Among unmarried mothers, 25, 32, and
44 percent are in terciles 1, 2, and 3, respectively. The outcome regressions
control for predicted probability tercile FE and the full set of controls from Table 8 column 4. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered
at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Fig. 1. Federal EITC Structure, 2018
Source: Authors’ calculations from IRS data.

Fig. 2. Maximum Possible Federal EITC over Time
Source: Authors’ calculations from IRS data.
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Fig. 3. State EITC Rates (as a Fraction of Federal Benefits) over Time
Notes: Authors’ calculations from NBER data. https://users.nber.org/~taxsim/state-eitc.html.
Although CA has a high match rate, it only matches up to half of the maximum federal EITC benefit, so in
our regressions we divide the CA state EITC rate by two.
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Fig. 4. Distribution M axEIT C, by Number of Children and Pre/Post-2009
Notes: 2003–2018 ATUS data. Sample includes all women aged 18–49.

Fig. 5. Time Spent Working and Time with Children, by Age of Child
Notes: 2003–2018 ATUS data. Sample includes all mothers aged 18–49.
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Fig. 6. Effect of the EITC on Time-Use among Unmarried Mothers: Prob(Hours > X)
Notes: 2003–2018 ATUS data. Sample includes all mothers aged 18–49. Each estimate comes from a separate
regression using equation (3). Work hours in Panel A come from CPS survey data; outcomes in Panels B–D
come from ATUS data, which asks about time-use in a single day and we scale these to weekly hours. Full set
of controls from Table 8 column 3 used in each regression. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity
and clustered at the state level.
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Fig. 7. EITC Effect on LFP and Time Spent with Children, by Mothers’ Age
Notes: 2003–2018 ATUS data. Sample includes all mothers aged 18–49. Each estimate comes from a
single regression resembling equation (1), except “MaxEITC × Unmarried” and “MaxEITC × Married” are
interacted with six binary age categories of the mother. Full set of controls from Table 8 column 3 used in
each regression. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state level.
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Fig. 8. Effects of the EITC on Time with Children, by Age of Children
Notes: 2003–2018 ATUS data. Sample includes all mothers aged 18–49. Estimates from equation (4). Full
set of controls from Table 8 column 3 used in each regression. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity
and clustered at the state level.

39

Appendix A: Additional Tables and Figures

1

Table A.1: Labor Supply, Earnings, and EITC Benefits, by Race and Education
Outcome:

LFP

Weekly EITC
Any Earnings Earnings
Work Benefits EITC
and EITC
Hours
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Panel A: Effects by Marital Status and Race
MaxEITC ×
-0.0054 -0.26 233.1*** 0.0041
421.9
655.0
White × Married
(0.011) (0.45) (36.1) (0.0096) (545.9) (537.7)
MaxEITC ×
-0.0081 -0.049 262.1*** 0.0099
539.1
801.2
Nonwhite × Married (0.0097) (0.42) (36.9) (0.0090) (533.4) (537.2)
MaxEITC ×
0.028*** 0.99*** 338.3*** 0.014 1449.2*** 1787.4***
White × Unmarried
(0.0094) (0.37) (35.2) (0.0098) (509.1) (509.9)
MaxEITC ×
0.016
0.54 401.8*** 0.031*** 822.7 1224.5**
Nonwhite × Unmarried (0.010) (0.39) (37.1) (0.0090) (536.4) (543.3)
R-squared
0.094
Eq. Eff. (p-val.)
0.000
Panel B: Effects by
MaxEITC × Married
-0.0095
× >12 Yrs Educ
(0.010)
MaxEITC × Married
-0.00051
× ≤12 Yrs Educ
(0.021)
MaxEITC × Unmarried 0.016
× >12 Yrs Educ
(0.012)
MaxEITC × Unmarried 0.032*
× ≤12 Yrs Educ
(0.018)
R-squared
Eq. Eff. (p-val.)
Observations
Mean Dep Var

0.132 0.285
0.292
0.213
0.201
0.000 0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Marital Status and Education
-0.59 89.7** -0.0049 951.7
1041.3
(0.37) (43.2) (0.0088) (780.5) (795.8)
0.21 427.3*** 0.017
-255.2
172.1
(0.77) (64.4) (0.021) (546.6) (526.0)
0.53 251.1*** 0.018** 1634.6** 1885.7**
(0.37) (43.6) (0.0080) (785.0) (802.9)
1.24* 518.0*** 0.025
640.1 1158.0**
(0.69) (62.1) (0.020) (472.0) (465.1)

0.093 0.131 0.287
0.000 0.000 0.000
43,685 43,685 43,685
0.74
21.6 1021.9

0.292
0.000
43,685
0.34

0.213
0.000
43,685
23514.9

0.200
0.000
43,685
24536.9

Notes: 2003–2018 ATUS data. Sample includes all mothers aged 18–49. Outcomes are based on
CPS data. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state level. Full
set of controls from Table 8 column 3 used in each regression. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

2

Table A.2: Robust to Various Measuring of Labor Supply
ATUS Time-Use Data
Outcome:

MaxEITC

CPS Data

Time-Use >0
≥ 20
≥ 40 Usual Working LFP
Work
Work
Work
Work Hours
NonHours
Hours Hours Hours
Self-Emp
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
Panel A: Average Effects (Sample of All Women, N=58,090)
1.13** 0.016** 0.020** 0.020** 0.61* 0.016* 0.020***
(0.45) (0.0077) (0.0085) (0.0077) (0.32) (0.0084) (0.0072)

R-squared

0.184
0.164
0.173
0.168 0.161 0.115
0.092
Panel B: Effects by Marital Status (Sample of All Women, N=58,090)
MaxEITC ×
0.77
0.011
0.014
0.014 0.094 0.0073 0.0077
Married
(0.46) (0.0080) (0.0088) (0.0082) (0.31) (0.0090) (0.0075)
MaxEITC ×
1.50*** 0.021*** 0.025*** 0.027*** 1.13*** 0.024*** 0.033***
Unmarried
(0.46) (0.0073) (0.0082) (0.0076) (0.31) (0.0080) (0.0064)
R-squared
0.184
0.165
0.174
0.169 0.164 0.117
0.096
Eq. Eff. (p-val.)
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000
Panel C: Effects by Marital Status and Race (Sample of All Women, N=58,090)
MaxEITC ×
0.71
0.011
0.014
0.013 0.059 0.0075 0.0072
White × Married
(0.47) (0.0081) (0.0089) (0.0083) (0.32) (0.0093) (0.0078)
MaxEITC ×
1.14** 0.013* 0.019** 0.019** 0.33 0.0082 0.011
Nonwhite × Married
(0.43) (0.0077) (0.0083) (0.0077) (0.30) (0.0074) (0.0065)
MaxEITC ×
1.66*** 0.023*** 0.027*** 0.030*** 1.21*** 0.028*** 0.034***
White × Unmarried
(0.47) (0.0075) (0.0083) (0.0076) (0.31) (0.0086) (0.0069)
MaxEITC ×
1.19** 0.016** 0.020** 0.021*** 0.97*** 0.015** 0.030***
Nonwhite × Unmarried
(0.47) (0.0077) (0.0086) (0.0077) (0.32) (0.0074) (0.0062)
R-squared
0.185
0.165
0.174
Eq. Eff. (p-val.)
0.000
0.000
0.000
Panel D: Effects by Marital Status (Sample
MaxEITC ×
0.055 0.00024 0.0011
Married
(0.72) (0.012) (0.013)
MaxEITC ×
0.63
0.0089 0.0098
Unmarried
(0.61) (0.0095) (0.010)
R-squared
Eq. Eff. (p-val.)
Mean Dep Var (All Women)
Mean Dep Var (Mothers)

0.157
0.045
26.15
23.5

0.144
0.060
0.493
0.46

0.151
0.057
0.438
0.40

0.170 0.165 0.118
0.000 0.000 0.000
of Mothers, N=43,685)
0.0017 -0.39 -0.0040
(0.011) (0.46) (0.013)
0.013 0.81** 0.015
(0.0095) (0.37) (0.011)
0.148
0.015
0.376
0.34

0.138
0.000
23.22
21.4

0.108
0.000
0.714
0.67

0.096
0.000
0.00010
(0.010)
0.030***
(0.0097)
0.084
0.000
0.735
0.69

Notes: 2003–2018 ATUS data. Sample includes all women aged 18–49. Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state level. These outcomes are based on time-use variables. Full set
of controls from Table 8 column 3 used in each regression. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A.3: State EITC Expansions and Labor Supply
Sample Years:
Outcome:

2003–2008
LFP Weekly Weekly
Work Work
Hours Hours

MaxEITC ×
Married
MaxEITC ×
Unmarried

CPS CPS
(1)
(2)
0.013 0.88*
(0.013) (0.50)
0.036** 1.67***
(0.014) (0.54)

R-squared
Observations
Mean Dep Var
Eq. Eff. (p-val.)

0.105 0.153 0.199
26,544 26,544 26,544
0.78
23.9
26.5
0.000 0.000 0.005

2009–2018
LFP Weekly Weekly
Work Work
Hours Hours

ATUS CPS CPS ATUS
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
0.98 -0.0025 -0.16 0.46
(0.71) (0.015) (0.50) (0.71)
1.73** 0.023* 0.87* 1.16
(0.76) (0.014) (0.50) (0.74)
0.116 0.178 0.188
31,546 31,546 31,546
0.78 23.3
26.0
0.000 0.000 0.005

Notes: 2003–2018 ATUS data. Sample includes all women aged 18–49.
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state
level. Full set of controls from Table 8 column 3 used in each regression.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A.4: The EITC and Decomposing All Time-Use (168 Weekly Hours)
Outcome:

Home Production

Leisure

Work School Sleep Uncat.

With Children?

Yes
No
Yes
No
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
Panel A: Effects by Marital Status and Race
MaxEITC ×
-0.37 -0.036 -0.33 0.018 -0.11 0.13 0.030
White × Married
(0.61) (0.40) (0.38) (0.51) (0.37) (0.45) (0.73)
MaxEITC ×
-0.16 0.033 -0.20 -0.66 -0.48 -0.18 0.34
Nonwhite × Married
(0.60) (0.41) (0.39) (0.51) (0.38) (0.46) (0.69)
MaxEITC ×
-1.11** -1.25*** 0.14 -0.39 -0.58 0.19 0.87
White × Unmarried
(0.51) (0.37) (0.34) (0.54) (0.37) (0.52) (0.62)
MaxEITC ×
-0.55 -1.02*** 0.47 -0.47 -0.46 -0.011 0.23
Nonwhite × Unmarried (0.54) (0.31) (0.38) (0.60) (0.35) (0.59) (0.64)
R-squared

0.117
Panel B:
MaxEITC × Married
-0.26
× >12 Yrs Educ
(0.60)
MaxEITC × Married
-0.45
× ≤12 Yrs Educ
(1.00)
MaxEITC × Unmarried -0.68
× >12 Yrs Educ
(0.56)
MaxEITC × Unmarried -1.16
× ≤12 Yrs Educ
(0.93)
Observations
43,685
Mean Dep Var (Mothers) 46.5

(8)
0.11
(0.27)
0.087
(0.27)
0.17
(0.30)
0.20
(0.30)

(9)

(10)

0.20 0.011
(0.36) (0.086)
0.40 0.0034
(0.37) (0.087)
0.45 0.011
(0.49) (0.11)
0.57 0.017
(0.47) (0.11)

0.222 0.077 0.113 0.144 0.141 0.158 0.133 0.113 0.024
Effects by Marital Status and Education
0.49 -0.75** 0.16 0.20 -0.046 -0.90 0.54** 0.38 0.077
(0.55) (0.34) (0.50) (0.36) (0.47) (0.84) (0.23) (0.38) (0.096)
-0.67
0.22 -0.35 -0.59 0.24 1.35 -0.52 0.048 -0.074
(0.57) (0.60) (1.07) (0.71) (0.79) (1.32) (0.47) (0.48) (0.14)
-0.83
0.15 -0.28 -0.36 0.085 -0.45 0.81*** 0.53 0.057
(0.51) (0.35) (0.59) (0.37) (0.55) (0.95) (0.28) (0.48) (0.10)
-1.68*** 0.52 -0.61 -0.81 0.20 2.00* -0.58 0.40 -0.051
(0.56) (0.56) (1.06) (0.66) (0.87) (1.12) (0.47) (0.57) (0.17)
43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685
22.0
24.4 33.4 15.6 17.8 23.5 2.18 60.9 1.49

Notes: 2003–2018 ATUS data. Sample includes all mothers aged 18–49. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state level. The six categories are mutually exclusive and sum to 168 weekly hours. Tables
A.6 and A.7 further decompose home production and leisure with children from columns 2 and 5. Full set of controls
from Table 8 column 3 used in each regression. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

5

Table A.5: Outcomes Robust to EITC Definition
Outcome:

EITC Phase-In Rate
× Married
EITC Phase-In Rate
× Unmarried
R-squared
Observations
EITC Phase-In Rate
× Married
EITC Phase-In Rate
× Unmarried
R-squared
Observations

LFP

Work Home Prod. Time with Investing
Hours and Leisure Children in Children
Hours
Hours
Hours
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Panel A: Sample = All Women
0.0020 0.064
-1.08
(0.012) (0.47)
(0.80)
0.037*** 1.41*** -2.26***
(0.010) (0.48)
(0.77)
0.103 0.160
0.159
58,090 58,090
58,090
Panel B: Sample = All Mothers
-0.019 -0.81
-0.27
0.49
(0.015) (0.60)
(1.21)
(0.89)
0.033*** 1.18**
-1.62
-2.92***
(0.012) (0.53)
(1.10)
(0.78)
0.093 0.131
43,685 43,685

0.122
43,685

0.260
43,685

0.47
(0.31)
-0.21
(0.28)
0.105
43,685

Notes: 2003–2018 ATUS data. Sample includes all women or all mothers aged 18–49. Units are
10 percentage points. The following example illustrates the phase-in rate: if the federal phasein rate is 40 percent and the state EITC matches 20 percent of the federal EITC, then the
total phase-in rate is 0.40(1+0.20)=0.48. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and
clustered at the state level. Full set of controls from Table 8 column 3 used in each regression.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A.6: Decomposing Home Production with Kids (from Table 5 Column 2)
Outcome:

MaxEITC ×
Married
MaxEITC ×
Unmarried

Personal House- Food Waiting, Caring Civic Eating Errands,
Care
work Prep Shopfor
Travel
ping Others
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
-0.069* 0.042 0.025 -0.087 0.024 -0.0074 0.11 -0.044
(0.035) (0.16) (0.041) (0.30) (0.046) (0.0066) (0.091) (0.061)
-0.11** -0.23* 0.029 -0.19 -0.0034 -0.0069 -0.015 -0.19***
(0.049) (0.15) (0.040) (0.29) (0.026) (0.0057) (0.088) (0.046)

R-squared
0.019
Eq. Eff. (p-val.) 0.257
Full Controls
X
Observations
43,685
Mean Dep Var
0.24

0.082
0.000
X
43,685
3.48

0.013 0.158 0.014 0.020 0.156 0.059
0.683 0.036 0.404 0.841 0.011 0.001
X
X
X
X
X
X
43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685
0.11
6.48
0.12 0.013 4.09
2.85

Notes: 2003–2018 ATUS data. Sample includes all 18–49 year-old mothers. Standard errors are
robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state level. Full set of controls from Table 8
column 3 used in each regression. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A.7: Decomposing Leisure with Kids (from Table 5 Column 5)
Outcome:

MaxEITC ×
Married
MaxEITC ×
Unmarried

Activities Educ Socializing Sports Religious Volunteer Phone Travel
with
& Relaxing
Children
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
0.13
0.0037
-0.43*
0.053 -0.013
0.0025 0.055*** 0.043
(0.17) (0.0081) (0.25) (0.052) (0.047) (0.042) (0.020) (0.035)
0.094 0.0030 -0.58** 0.038 -0.051
-0.074 0.039** 0.0035
(0.17) (0.0085) (0.25) (0.051) (0.049) (0.055) (0.017) (0.036)

R-squared
0.087
Eq. Eff. (p-val.) 0.456
Full Controls
X
Observations
43,685
Mean Dep Var
2.98

0.011
0.756
X
43,685
0.017

0.097
0.202
X
43,685
10.2

0.024 0.055
0.468 0.028
X
X
43,685 43,685
0.63
0.52

0.016
0.001
X
43,685
0.33

0.022 0.050
0.053 0.004
X
X
43,685 43,685
0.14
0.78

Notes: 2003–2018 ATUS data. Sample includes all 18–49 year-old mothers. Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state level. Full set of controls from Table 8 column 3 used in each
regression. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A.8: Decomposing Health and “Other” Investment in Kids” (Table 6 columns 7 and 8)
Health Investment

MaxEITC ×
Married
MaxEITC ×
Unmarried

Provide Obtain
Medical Medical
Care
Care
(1)
(2)
-0.068** -0.055*
(0.023) (0.028)
-0.085*** -0.068**
(0.022) (0.026)

R-squared
0.010
0.016
Eq. Eff. (p-val.)
0.013
0.253
Unmarried vs Mar -0.017** -0.012
Difference
(0.0070) (0.011)
Observations
Mean Dep Var

43,685
0.11

Other Investment
Play
(3)
0.16
(0.15)
0.24**
(0.14)

Arts
and
Crafts
(4)
0.0022
(0.013)
0.0049
(0.013)

Sports
(5)
0.051
(0.052)
0.032
(0.051)

Talk
and
Listen
(6)
-0.040
(0.038)
-0.064*
(0.038)

Organize Look
and
After
Plan
Kids
(7)
(8)
0.0069
0.085
(0.012) (0.075)
-0.0016
0.026
(0.012) (0.083)

Attend
Events
(9)
0.041
(0.062)
-0.051
(0.046)

0.082 0.013 0.020 0.037
0.016
0.029
0.029
0.067 0.678 0.326 0.044
0.049
0.005
0.000
0.076* 0.0027 -0.019 -0.024** -0.0085** -0.059*** -0.092***
(0.041) (0.0064) (0.019) (0.012) (0.0043) (0.021) (0.020)

43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685 43,685
0.12
2.28 0.075 0.56
0.41

43,685
0.078

43,685
0.60

43,685
0.63

Notes: 2003–2018 ATUS data. Sample includes all 18–49 year-old mothers. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the state level. Full set of controls from Table 8 column 3 used in each regression.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Fig. A.1. Maximum Possible Federal + State EITC over Time
Source: Authors’ calculations from IRS and NBER data. Each point denotes a state by year value.

Fig. A.2. CDF of Weekly Work Hours, by Number of Children
Notes: 2003–2018 ATUS data. Sample includes all women aged 18–49. Weekly work hours from CPS hours
worked last week.
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Fig. A.3. CDF of Home-Production Hours, by Number of Children
Notes: 2003–2018 ATUS data. Sample includes all women aged 18–49. Home production hours from ATUS
data, which asks about time-use in a single day (scaled to weekly hours).

Fig. A.4. CDF of Weekly Leisure Hours, by Number of Children
Notes: 2003–2018 ATUS data. Sample includes all women aged 18–49. Leisure hours comes from ATUS
data, which asks about time-use in a single day (scaled to weekly hours).
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Fig. A.5. CDF of Weekly Hours with Children, by Number of Children
Notes: 2003–2018 ATUS data. Sample includes all women aged 18–49. Time with kids comes from ATUS
data, which asks about time-use in a single day (scaled to weekly hours).

Fig. A.6. CDF of Weekly Hours Invested in Children, by Number of Children
Notes: 2003–2018 ATUS data. Sample includes all women aged 18–49. Investment hours comes from ATUS
data, which asks about time-use in a single day (scaled to weekly hours).
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Fig. A.7. EITC Effect on Time-Use by Unmarried Women: Prob(Hours > X)
Notes: 2003–2018 ATUS data. Sample includes all women aged 18–49. Figure identical to Figure 6 Panels
A-D except the sample includes all women. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered
at the state level. Full set of controls from Table 8 column 3 used in each regression.
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Data Appendix: ATUS Data Activity Lexicon (2003)
This appendix provides a detailed description of how we categorized all ATUS time-use
activities.
The American Time Use Survey (ATUS) is a comprehensive survey of time use in the
U.S. and has been administered annually since 2003. The ATUS sample is drawn from the
Current Population Surveys (CPS), covering the population of non-institutionalized civilians
at least 15 years old. Typical sample sizes have been about 26,000 respondents since 2004
with surveys administered evenly throughout the year. We use sample weights designed to
adjust for stratified sampling, non-response, and to get a representative measure for each
day of the year.
The survey asks individuals detailed information about all of their activities over the
previous day, including who they were with at the time. The survey also collects information
about the respondent and household. It can be linked with the CPS data. Our analysis
combines data from the 2003–2018 surveys.
The following provides a detailed breakdown of how we categorized all ATUS time-use
activities based on the 2003 ATUS Data Activity Lexicon.

HOME PRODUCTION:
01 Personal Care
01.02 Grooming - all
01.03 Health-related Self Care - all
01.05 Personal Care Emergencies - all
01.99 Personal Care, n.e.c* - all
02 Household Activities
02.01 Housework - all
02.02 Food and Drink Preparation, Presentation, and Clean-up - all
02.03 Interior Maintenance, Repair, and Decoration - all
02.04 Exterior Maintenance, Repair, and Decoration - all
02.05 Lawn, Garden, and Houseplants - all
02.06 Animals and Pets - all
02.07 Vehicles - all
02.08 Appliances and Tools - all
02.09 Household Management - all
02.99 Household Activities, n.e.c* - all
03 Caring For and Helping Household Members
03.01 Caring For and Helping Household Children
03.01.01 Physical care for household children
03.01.06 Talking with/listening to household children
03.01.07 Helping/teaching household children (not related to education)
03.01.08 Organization and planning for household children
03.01.09 Looking after household children (as a primary activity)
03.01.10 Waiting for/with household children
03.01.11 Picking up/dropping off household children (as a primary activity)
13

04

07
08
09
10
11
16

17

03.01.99 Caring for and helping household children, n.e.c.*
03.02 Activities Related to household Children’s Education - all
03.03 Activities Related to household Children’s Health - all
03.04 Caring for Household Adults - all
03.05 Helping Household Adults - all
03.99 Caring for and Helping Household Members, n.e.c.* - all
Caring For and Helping Nonhousehold Members
04.01 Caring For and Helping nonhousehold Children
04.01.01 Physical care for nonhousehold children
04.01.06 Talking with/listening to nonhousehold children
04.01.07 Helping/teaching nonhousehold children (not related to education)
04.01.08 Organization and planning for nonhousehold children
04.01.09 Looking after nonhousehold children (as primary activity)
04.01.11 Waiting for/with nonhousehold children
Consumer Purchases - all
Professional and Personal Care Services - all
Household Services - all
Government Services and Civic Obligations - all
Eating and Drinking - all
Telephone Calls
16.01 Telephone Calls (to or from)
16.01.03 Telephone calls to/from education services providers
16.01.04 Telephone calls to/from salespeople
16.01.05 Telephone calls to/from professional or pers. care svcs providers
16.01.06 Telephone calls to/from household services providers
16.01.07 Telephone calls to/from paid child or adult care providers
16.01.08 Telephone calls to/from government officials
16.99 Telephone Calls, n.e.c* - all
Traveling
17.01 Travel Related to Personal Care - all
17.02 Travel Related to Household Activities - all
17.03 Travel Related to Caring For and Helping household Members - all
17.04 Travel Related to Caring For and Helping Nonhousehold Members - all
17.07 Travel Related to Consumer Purchases - all
17.08 Travel Related to Using Professional and Personal Care Services - all
17.09 Travel Related to Using Household Services - all
17.10 Travel Related to Using Government Services and Civic Obligations - all
17.11 Travel Related to Eating and Drinking - all
17.16 Travel Related to Telephone Calls - all
17.17 Security Procedures Related to Traveling - all
17.99 Travel n.e.c.* - all
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SCHOOL:
06 Education
06.01 Taking Class
06.01.01 Taking class: degree
06.01.03 Waiting associated with taking classes
06.01.04 Security procedures related to taking classes
06.01.99 Taking class, n.e.c.*
06.03 Research/Homework
06.03.01 Research/homework: class for degree
06.03.03 Waiting associated with research/homework
06.03.99 Research/homework n.e.c*
06.04 Registration/Administrative Activities
06.04.01 Administrative activities: class for degree
06.04.03 Waiting associated with administrative activities (education)
06.04.99 Administrative for education, n.e.c*
06.99 Education, n.e.c* - all
17 Traveling
17.06 Travel Related to Education - all

WORK:
05 Working and Work-Related Activities - all
17 Traveling
17.05 Travel Related to Work - all

LEISURE:
01 Personal Care
01.04 Personal Activities - all
03 Caring For and Helping Household Members
03.01 Caring For and Helping Household Children
03.01.02 Reading to/with household children
03.01.03 Playing with household children, not sports
03.01.04 Arts and crafts with household children
03.01.05 Playing sports with household children
03.01.10 Attending household children’s events
04 Caring For and Helping Nonhousehold Members
04.01 Caring For and Helping nonhousehold Children
04.01.02 Reading to/with nonhousehold children
04.01.03 Playing with nonhousehold children
04.01.04Arts and crafts with nonhousehold children
04.01.05 Playing sports with nonhousehold children
04.01.10 Attending nonhousehold children’s events
04.01.12 Dropping off/picking up nonhousehold children
15

06

12
13
14
15
16

17

04.01.99 Caring for nonhousehold children n.e.c.*
04.02 Activities Related to Nonhousehold Children’s Education - all
04.03 Activities Related to Nonhousehold Children’s Health - all
04.04 Caring For Nonhousehold Adults - all
04.05 Helping Nonhousehold Adults - all
04.99 Caring for and Helping Nonhousehold Members, n.e.c.* - all
Education
06.01 Taking Class
06.01.02 Taking class: personal interest
06.02 Extracurricular School Activities (Except Sports) - all
06.03 Research/Homework
06.03.02 Research/homework: class for personal interest
06.04 Registration/Administrative Activities
06.04.02 Administrative activities: class for personal interest
Socializing, Relaxing, and Leisure - all
Sports, Exercise, and Recreation - all
Religious and Spiritual Activities - all
Volunteer Activities - all
Telephone Calls
16.01 Telephone Calls (to or from)
16.01.01 Telephone calls to/from family members
16.01.21 Telephone calls to/from friends, neighbors, or acquaintances
Traveling
17.12 Travel Related to Socializing, Relaxing, and Leisure - all
17.13 Travel Related to Sports, Exercise, and Recreation - all
17.14 Travel Related to Religious/Spiritual Activities - all
17.15 Travel Related to Volunteer Activities - all

UNCATEGORIZED:
01 Personal Care
01.01 Sleeping - all
50 Data Codes - all

INVESTMENT TIME
Our measure of child time investment sums all of the time parents report spending with
children in each of the following activities (each categorized as either home production or
leisure as above):
(03.01) Caring For and Helping Household Children: (03.01.02) Reading to/with household
children; (03.01.03) Playing with household children, not sports; (03.01.04) Arts and crafts
with household children; (03.01.05) Playing sports with household children; (03.01.06) Talking with/listening to household children; (03.01.07) Helping/teaching household children
(not related to education); (03.01.08) Organization and planning for household children;
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(03.01.09) Looking after household children (as a primary activity; (03.01.10) Attending
household children’s events.
(03.02) Activities Related to Household Children’s Education: (03.02.01) Homework (household children); (03.02.02) Meetings and School Conferences (household children); (03.02.03)
Home schooling of household children.
(03.03) Activities Related to Household Children’s Health: (03.03.01) Providing medical care
to household children; (03.03.02) Obtaining medical care for household children.
(12.03) Relaxing and Leisure: (12.03.07) Playing games; (12.03.09) Arts and crafts as a
hobby.
(12.04) Arts and Entertainment (other than sports): (12.04.01) Attending performing arts;
(12.04.02) Attending museum; (12.04.03) Attending movies/film.
(13.01) Participating in Sports, Exercise, and Recreation: all subcategories.
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